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Abstract— A variety of anomaly detection schemes have been
proposed to detect malicious attacks to Cyber-Physical Systems.
Among these schemes, Dynamic Watermarking methods have
been proven highly effective at detecting a wide range of attacks.
Unfortunately, in contrast to other anomaly detectors, no
method has been presented to design a Dynamic Watermarking
detector to achieve a user-specified false alarm rate, or subse-
quently evaluate the capabilities of an attacker under such a
selection. This paper describes methods to measure the capabil-
ity of an attacker, to numerically approximate this metric, and
to design a Dynamic Watermarking detector that can achieve
a user-specified rate of false alarms. The performance of the
Dynamic Watermarking detector is compared to three classical
anomaly detectors in simulation and on a real-world platform.
These experiments illustrate that the attack capability under
the Dynamic Watermarking detector is comparable to those
of classic anomaly detectors. Importantly, these experiments
also make clear that the Dynamic Watermarking detector
is consistently able to detect attacks that the other class of
detectors are unable to identify.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have proven difficult to
secure due to the ever-present risk of malicious attacks.
Failure to detect such attacks can have catastrophic conse-
quences [1]–[3]. Though these real-world attacks, such as
the Stuxnet Worm or the attack on the Ukranian Power Grid,
highlight the threat to existing industrial facilities and public
utilities, researchers speculate that attacks on next generation
transportation systems could be even more dangerous due to
the reliance on communication between infrastructure and
privately owned vehicles [4]–[6].
To counter the growing risks of attacks on CPS, re-
searchers have attempted to develop techniques to detect
attacks while they are being conducted. Rather than address
all possible attacks, researchers have focused on detecting
additive attacks in which an attacker alters a measurement
that is used while performing feedback control. To identify
these attacks at run-time, detection schemes compute the
residual between a state observer and measurements and
then analyze this residual signal to determine whether an
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Fig. 1. This paper describes a real-world implementation of malicious
attack detection on a Segway Robotics Mobility Platform performing a
path-following task (top). An additive attack is applied to this system as
shown in the block diagram (bottom). Four different detectors (χ2, CUSUM,
MEWMA, and the presented Dynamic Watermarking method) are applied in
the “Detector” block. The Dynamic Watermarking method is shown to detect
attacks that the others cannot, without sacrificing tracking performance
relative to the desired path. Video of this example can be found at [10].
attack is taking place. Three detectors, which were originally
proposed for anomaly detection in quality control applica-
tions [7], analyze the residual signal: the χ2, cumulative sum
(CUSUM), and multivariate exponentially weighted moving
average (MEWMA) detectors [8], [9].
To detect an attack, each of the detectors evaluates a test
statistic that is a function of the residual. If this statis-
tics value rises above some user-specified threshold, then
the detector triggers an alarm. To evaluate and design the
threshold for these detectors, researchers have proposed the
following three metrics: first, the attack capability or the
amount of perturbation to the state of the system that an
attack can induce without either inducing an alarm [9] or
without increasing the rate of alarms [11], [12]; second, the
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rate of false alarms (RFA) given by the detector when no
attack is occurring; and third, the ability of the detector to
reliably detect specific attack models. For an open-loop stable
system, the attack capability can be evaluated by computing
the reachable set of the error in the observed state. Since
computing this reachable set can be challenging, researchers
have instead attempted to evaluate surrogates for the attack
capability such as the expected value of the state vector [9] or
the norm of the largest time invariant residual [13]. However,
these surrogates are unable to accurately characterize the
attack capability of attacks that have large residuals for short
amounts of time. Note that, by reducing the threshold in
any detector, one can reduce the attack capability; however,
this can increase the rate of false alarms. To compute
this false alarm rate for classic anomaly detectors, it is
typically assumed that the residuals are independent [9], [13].
Unfortunately, simulated experiments have noted that this
assumption can lead to a consistent error while computing
the false alarm rate [9]. Researchers have also shown that a
χ2 detector is always capable of identifying a specific type
of additive attack where a measured signal is replayed [14];
however, the ability to detect specific attacks has been less
studied for the other detectors.
More recently, researchers have begun exploring tech-
niques to detect more sophisticated attacks, which exploit
knowledge of the system dynamics. These detectors rely on
Dynamic Watermarking wherein an excitation signal that is
only known to the control system is introduced into the
input. The detector then evaluates the covariance of the
residual signal with the watermark to determine whether
the system is under attack. These Dynamic Watermarking
based detectors are theoretically proven to detect attacks
that exploit knowledge of the system dynamics. Initially,
Dynamic Watermarking was developed for LTI systems with
full rank input matrices and full state observations. These
methods were proven to detect arbitrary attack models [15]
including attacks that replayed a measured signal [16]. These
methods were later extended to generalized LTI systems [17],
and to networked control systems [18].
Though Dynamic Watermarking is proven to be capable
of detecting a larger class of attacks when compared to
prior detection algorithms, to the best of our knowledge, no
one has conducted a real-world evaluation of any of these
attack detection algorithms. Moreover, no one has evaluated
the attack capability of a system employing a Dynamic
Watermarking scheme as a function of false alarm rate or
developed a technique to design a detector using Dynamic
Watermarking that achieves a user-specified false alarm rate.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, in
Section IV-A, we construct a metric for quantifying the attack
capability based on the reachable set of the portion of the
observer error related to the residual without triggering an
alarm, and we develop a technique to compute an outer
approximation of this reachable set for the χ2, CUSUM,
MEWMA, and Dynamic Watermarking detectors. Second,
in Section IV-B, we develop an empirical method to design
a Dynamic Watermarking detector that achieves a user-
specified false alarm rate. Third, in Section V-A, the attack
capability for each detector is compared, and in Section V-
B a real world example, shown in Figure 1, is presented
to evaluate the performance of the χ2, CUSUM, MEWMA,
and Dynamic Watermarking detectors for specific attacks.
See [10] for a video of this real-world test. The rest of this
document is outlined as follows. In Section II, we define the
notation used in the paper, along with the LTI system model
and assumptions. In Section III we provide notation for each
of the detectors. We draw conclusions in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section describes the notation and assumptions used
throughout the paper for the LTI system model.
A. Notation
This paper uses three different probability distributions:
the multivariate Gaussian distribution, denoted N (µ,Σ),
with mean µ and covariance Σ; the χ2 distribution, denoted
χ2(i), with i degrees of freedom; and the the Wishart
distribution, denoted W (Σ, i), with scale matrix Σ and i
degrees of freedom [19, Section 7.2]. The Euclidean Norm
of a vector X ∈ Rn is denoted ‖X‖. Similarly, the induced
operator norm for a matrix X ∈ Rn×m is denoted ‖X‖. The
expectation of a variable X is denoted E[X ]. Zero matrices
of dimension i× j are denoted 0i× j, and in the case that
i = j the notation is simplified to 0i. The identity matrix of
dimension i is denoted Ii. The closed unit ball of radius ε is
denotedBε . The Minkowsi sum is denoted ⊕. The minimum
singular value of a matrix X ∈ Rn×m is denoted s1(X).
B. LTI Model
This paper considers a discrete linear time invariant sys-
tems where the discrete time step is indexed by n ∈ N:
xn+1 = Axn+Bun+wn (1)
yn =Cxn+ zn+ vn (2)
with state xn ∈Rp, measurement yn ∈Rq, and input un ∈Rm.
The process noise wn ∈ Rp and the measurement noise zn ∈
Rq are assumed to be Gaussian with wn ∼ N (0,Σw) and
zn ∼N (0,Σz). At each time step, the attacker adds vn ∈Rq
to the measurement. For each n∈N an observer recovers the
full observed state xˆn from the measurements:
xˆn+1 =(A+LC)xˆn+Bun−Lyn. (3)
The observed state is then used in full state feedback:
un =Kxˆn+ en (4)
where en ∼ N (0,Σe) is a private watermark and is only
added when running the Dynamic Watermarking detector.
The controller gain matrix K and the observer gain matrix
L are chosen such that the closed loop matrices (A+BK)
and (A+LC) are Schur Stable. For each n ∈N, the observer
error δn = xˆn− xn then has the following update equation:
δn+1 = (A+LC)δn−wn−Lzn−Lvn. (5)
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Denote the residual as rn which is defined as:
rn =Cxˆn− yn =Cδn− zn− vn. (6)
When the system is not being attacked, i.e. vn = 0, ∀n ∈ N,
the steady state covariance for the observer error Σδ =
limn→∞E[δnδTn ] can be found by a Discrete Lyapunov Equa-
tion as described in [20, Section 2.2.2]:
Σδ =(A+LC)Σδ (A+LC)T +Σw+LΣzLT . (7)
We can then use the steady state covariance of the observer
error to find the steady state covariance of the residual Σr
when the system is not being attacked:
Σr = lim
n→∞E[rnr
T
n ] (8)
= lim
n→∞E[Cδnδ
T
n C
T −CδnzTn − znδTn CT + znzTn ] (9)
=CΣδCT +Σz, (10)
where the expectation of the cross terms in (9) are zero due to
causality. Using the steady state covariance of the residuals,
define the normalized residual r¯n:
r¯n = Σ
−1/2
r rn. (11)
Furthermore, we define the vector of current and previous
normalized residuals:
Rn = [r¯Tn . . . r¯
T
0 ]
T . (12)
III. DETECTION ALGORITHMS
This section describes the technical details of each of
the detection algorithms explored in this paper. At each
time step, each detector computes a test statistic, a∗(Rn),
based on current and previous residuals. The subscript ∗ is a
placeholder for the detector designation, and n is the discrete
time step. If, for a given detector, the test statistic exceeds a
predefined threshold, then the detector raises an alarm. These
thresholds are denoted by τ∗.
A. χ2 Detector
The χ2 detector uses the normalized residual r¯n to develop
a statistical test. Since, under the assumption of no attack,
r¯n ∼N (0, I), the χ2 detector is defined as:
aχ2(Rn) = r¯
T
n r¯n < τχ2 , (13)
where the test statistic aχ2(Rn)∼ χ2(q) when the system is
not under attack. A change to the distribution of the residual,
as a result of an attack, may change the resulting distribution
of the χ2 test value, but this is not true for all attacks. For
instance an attack could replace the residual vectors with:
r′n = Σ
1/2
r r¯′n = Σ
1/2
r
[√
cn 0 . . . 0
]T (14)
where cn ∼ χ2(q). Then r¯′Tn r¯′n = cn ∼ χ2(q). Similarly some
attacks, such as the one described in Section V-B, can
generate a false set of residuals that have the same distri-
bution as the residual when no attack is taking place. Such
attacks would be indistinguishable by the χ2 detector while
increasing the error in the observed state. Furthermore, the
χ2 detector is memoryless, which can make detecting small
increases in the norm of the residuals difficult.
B. CUSUM Detector
The CUSUM detector addresses the difficulty in detecting
small but persistent increases in the norm of the normalized
residual by introducing dynamics to its test statistic:
aC(Rn) = max(aC(Rn−1)+ r¯Tn r¯n− γ,0)< τC, (15)
where aC(R−1) = 0, and γ is a parameter called the forgetting
factor. To ensure that the test statistic is stable, γ > q where
q is the dimension of the residual [9, Theorem 1]. Similar
to the χ2 detector, the CUSUM detector bounds the norm of
the normalized residual under the assumption of no alarms:
r¯Tn r¯n− γ ≤ aC(Rn−1)+ r¯Tn r¯n− γ < τC. (16)
For the CUSUM detector, a persistent increase in the norm of
the normalized residual, increases the likelihood that r¯Tn r¯
T
n >
γ . When this is true for several steps, the CUSUM test value
increases cumulatively, triggering an alarm.
C. MEWMA Detector
The MEWMA detector test statistic also incorporates
dynamics. The MEWMA detector uses the exponentially
weighted moving average of the normalized residual:
Gn =β r¯n+(1−β )Gn−1 (17)
where G−1 = 0 and the parameter β ∈ (0,1] is also called
the forgetting factor. The MEWMA detector is then defined
as:
aM(Rn) =
2−β
β
GTn Gn < τM. (18)
When β = 1 the test statistic is equal to the χ2 detector’s test
statistic. For smaller β , one gets a similar effect to that of the
CUSUM detector, because, for a forgetting factor β ∈ (0,1),
a persistent increase in the norm of the residual results in
a larger value of G which results in a higher test statistic
value. However, the MEWMA test statistic does not increase
for all persistent changes. For instance, if the covariance of
the residuals under attack are αΣr for some α ∈ (0,1), we
expect a lower test value.
D. Dynamic Watermarking
Dynamic Watermarking is designed to address the short-
comings of the previous detection algorithms by sounding an
alarm not only for changes in the distribution of the norm of
the normalized residual (as the χ2 and CUSUM detectors are
able to do), but also for persistent changes in the distribution
of the normalized residual as the MEWMA detector is able
to do. To illustrate this, we now briefly summarize the results
of [17]. In its statistical limit form, Dynamic Watermarking
was developed to detect any persistent change made to the
residual:
Theorem 1. [17, Theorem 1] Suppose (A,B) is stabilizable,
(A,C) is detectable, Σe is full rank, and:
k′ = min{k ≥ 0 | C(A+BK)kB 6= 0}. (19)
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If:
aslim
N→∞
1
N
N−1
∑
i=0
rnrTn = Σr and (20)
aslim
N→∞
1
N
N−1
∑
i=0
rneTn−k = 0, (21)
then the asymptotic attack power, defined as:
lim
N→∞
1
N
N−1
∑
i=0
vTn vn (22)
must converge to 0.
For an attack to have a persistent effect on the system, the
asymptotic attack power must be greater than 0. Since the
test described in Theorem 1 requires evaluating an infinite
sum, it does not consider attacks that are not persistent for
all time. To detect attacks which are not persistent in time,
the infinite time tests are transformed into finite time tests
by taking a sliding window of the combined values of the
sums in (20) and (21):
Dn =
n
∑
n−`+1
ψnψTn (23)
ψTn = Σ
−1/2
ψ
[
rTn (en−k)T
]
(24)
where ` is the size of the sliding window and:
Σψ =
[
Σr 0
0 Σe
]
. (25)
In this paper, we have normalized the vector ψn in (24)
for the convenience of later derivations. The matrix quantity
Dn is then approximately distributed according to a Wishart
Distribution, W (I, `) [17], giving rise to the Dynamic Wa-
termarking detector we use in this work:
aD (Rn) =L `m+q(Dn)< τD (26)
where L is the negative log likelihood function:
L ji (X) =
(i+1− j)
2
· log(|X |)+ 1
2
trace(X)+
+ log
(
2i j/2Γ(i)(
j
2
)
)
. (27)
Note, we have also modified the formula from [17], by
including a constant term, and removing the scale matrix
inverse from the trace in (27) due to the normalization carried
out in (24). Note that for n< `+k′, the test statistic value is
defined as 0.
IV. ANALYTICAL COMPARISONS
This section describes the metric for the attack capability,
and derives methods for approximating the attack capability
and the RFA for the χ2, CUSUM, MEWMA, and Dynamic
Watermarking detectors.
A. Attack Capability
Assuming the A matrix is Schur Stable, the capability of
an attack can be measured by its ability to affect the observer
error δn. A reachable set of the observer error can evaluate
the attack capability, but, since the noise is supported over
an infinitely large set, this reachable set would have infinite
volume. As a result, this work focuses on computing the
volume of the reachable set of the portion of the observer
error corresponding to the residual under the condition of no
alarms being raised. To provide a rigorous definition of this
set, we introduce some additional notation and definitions.
Using superposition, one can split the observer error
described in (5) into two pieces:
δ (a)n+1 = (A+LC)δ
(a)
n −Lzn−Lvn (28)
δ (b)n+1 = (A+LC)δ
(b)
n −wn. (29)
The observer error is then δn = δ
(a)
n +δ
(b)
n . Here δ
(a)
n is the
portion related to the residual, which can be seen by applying
(6) and (11) to (28):
δ (a)n+1 = Aδ
(a)
n +LΣ
1/2
r r¯n. (30)
Since an attack is only able to affect the δ (a)n portion of the
observer error, the other portion is ignored while evaluating
attack capability. For each n∈N, denote the reachable set of
δ (a)n at a given time step n under the condition of no alarms
for a threshold τ∗ as Rτ∗n and define it as:
Rτ∗n = {δ (a)n | δ (a)n = A¯n−1Rn−1, Rn−1 ∈Ωτ∗n } (31)
where:
Ωτ∗n−1 = {Rn−1 | a∗(Rn−1)< τ∗ ∀i< n}, (32)
and:
A¯n =
[
LΣ1/2r ALΣ
1/2
r . . . AnLΣ
1/2
r
]
. (33)
Furthermore, we denote the steady state reachable set under
the condition of no alarms for a threshold τ∗ as Rτ∗ and
define it as:
Rτ∗ = {δ (a) | ∀n ∈ N, ∃m ∈ N s.t. m> n,δ (a) ∈Rτ∗m }.
(34)
Finally, we evaluate the attack capability by measuring the
volume of the steady state reachable set under the condition
of no alarms under a threshold τ∗, which is defined as:
VRS(τ∗) = µ(Rτ∗), (35)
where µ denotes the Lebesgue measure.
Calculating the set Rτ∗ can be difficult, so we first derive
a method for calculating Rτ∗n :
Theorem 2. Suppose τ∗ ∈R and A¯n−1, Rn−1,Rτ∗n , and Ωτ∗n−1
are as in (33), (12), (31), and (32), respectively. Suppose
v : Rq→ R is the solution to:
inf
v∈C
∫
v(δ ) dδ (36)
s.t. v(δ )≥ 0 δ ∈ Rq (37)
v(A¯n−1Rn−1)−1≥ 0 Rn−1 ∈Ωτ∗n−1 (38)
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where C is the space of continuous functions. Then the 1
super-level set of v is an outer approximation to Rτ∗n
Proof. Let δ ∈Rτ∗n . Then, from (31), there exists an Rn−1 ∈
Ωτ∗n−1 such that δ = A¯n−1Rn−1. The constraint in (38) then
gives v(A¯n−1Rn−1) = v(δ )≥ 1. 
To make this problem computationally tractable, we op-
timize over polynomial functions of fixed degree instead
of continuous functions, and describe the positivity con-
straint, (38), with a Sums-of-Squares constraint. We then
apply Sums-of-Squares Programming to generate an outer
approximation to the reachable set. To replace (38) with a
Sums of Squares constraint, Ωτ∗n must first be replaced with
a semi-algebraic set [21, Theorem 2.14]. To simplify our
exposition, we denote by Θτ∗n a collection of semi-algebraic
constraints such that Ωτ∗n ⊆ Θτ∗n . In fact, as we show next,
for many detectors, Ωτ∗n =Θτ∗n .
For the χ2 detector, the constraint of no alarms is a
quadratic constraint on the residual, so:
Θ
τχ2
n =
{
Rn | RTn Q
τχ2
(i,n)Rn < 1 i = 0, ...,n
}
(39)
where:
Q
τχ2
(i,n) =
1
τχ2
0q(n−i) 0 00 Iq 0
0 0 0q(i)
 . (40)
Note that Θ
τχ2
n =Ω
τχ2
n since
aχ2 (Ri)
τχ2
=RTn Q
τχ2
(i,n)Rn for all i≤ n.
For the CUSUM detector:
ΘτCn =
{
Rn | RTn QτC(i, j,n)Rn < 1 i = 0, ...,n j ≤ i
}
(41)
where:
QτC
(i, j,n) =
1
τC + γ( j+1)
0q(n−i) 0 00 Iq( j+1) 0
0 0 0q(i− j)
 . (42)
Note that ΘτCn =ΩτCn , since:
aC(Ri) = max
({
i
∑
h=i− j
(r¯Th r¯h− γ) | j ≤ i
}
,0
)
(43)
and:
RTn Q(i, j,n)Rn =
1
τC + γ( j+1)
i
∑
h=i− j
r¯hT r¯h < 1 (44)
can be rearranged to form:
i
∑
h=i− j
(r¯Th r¯h− γ)< τC. (45)
For the MEWMA detector note that:
ΘτMn =
{
Rn | RTn QτM(i,n)Rn < 1 i = 0, ...n
}
(46)
where:
QτM
(i,n) =
2−β
βτM

0q(n−i)×q
β Iq
(1−β )β Iq
...
(1−β )iβ Iq


0q(n−i)×q
β Iq
(1−β )β Iq
...
(1−β )iβ Iq

T
. (47)
Note that ΘτMn =ΩτMn since aM(Ri)τM = R
T
n Q
τM
(i,n)Rn for all i≤ n.
While Ωτ∗n is already a semi-algebraic set for the χ2,
CUSUM and the MEWMA detectors, this is not true for
the Dynamic Watermarking detector due to the log function
in (27). Therefore, we consider an outer approximation to
ΩτDn described via a quadratic constraint:
Theorem 3. Suppose ΩτDn is as in (32), ` is the window size
of the Dynamic Watermarking detector, τD is the threshold
of the detector, k′ is as in (19), q is the dimension of the
residual, m is the dimension of the input signal, and:
ΘτDn =
{
Rn | RTn QτD(i,n)Rn < 1 i = `+ k′, ...,n
}
, (48)
where:
QτD
(i,n) =
1
(m+q)ε
0q(n−i) 0 00 Iq` 0
0 0 0q(i−`)
 (49)
and where ε > `−1−q−m is a solution to:
τD =
(q+m)ε
2
+
(q+m+1− `)
2
log(εq+m)+
+ log
(
2(q+m)`/2Γ(q+m)(
`
2
)
)
. (50)
Then ΩτDn ⊂ΘτDn .
To prove this theorem, consider the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose (gi)i ∈ N is a sequence of vectors where
gi ∈Rq, τ ∈R such that τ > 0, and `∈N such that ` > q+1.
Furthermore suppose that:
L `q (
`
∑
i=1
gigTi )< τ (51)
where the function L `q is as in (27). Then:
`
∑
i=1
gTi gi < εq, (52)
where ε > `−1−q is a solution to:
τ =
(q)ε
2
+
(q+1− `)
2
log(εq)+
+ log
(
2(q)`/2Γ(q)(
`
2
)
)
. (53)
Proof. (Lemma 1) Denote the eigenvalues of ∑`i−1 gigTi as
λ1, ...λq. The eigenvalues are all non-negative due to the
construction of the matrix. Note that we can rewrite (27)
as a new function L ji in terms of these eigenvalues:
L `q
(
`
∑
i−1
gigTi
)
= L`q(λ1, ...,λq) (54)
=
q
∑
i=1
(q+1− `)
2
· log(λi)+ λi2 +
+ log
(
2(q)`/2Γ(q)(
`
2
)
)
. (55)
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Furthermore we have that L`q is convex since:
∇2L`q(λ1, ...,λq) =

(`−1−q)
2λ 21
0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 `−1−q2λ 2q
 (56)
is positive definite for λi > 0. Also note that the function
achieves a global minimum at λi = `−1−q i= 1, ...,q since:
∇L`q(λ1, ...,λq) =

q+1−`
2λ1
+ 12
...
q+1−`
2λq +
1
2
 (57)
is zero at this point. If we consider the particular case where
λ1 = ...= λq = ε . Then (ε, ...,ε) is a boundary point to the
τ level set of L`q. Furthermore we have that the derivative at
that point is:
∇L`q(ε, ...,ε) =

q+1−`
2ε +
1
2
...
q+1−`
2ε +
1
2
 (58)
which is some positive scalar times the vector
[
1 . . . 1
]T .
Since the tangent plane at this point is a supporting hyper-
plane to the τ sublevel set of L`q we then have that:
`
∑
i=1
gTi gi =
q
∑
i=1
λi < εq (59)
for all gi such that L `q (∑`i=1 gigTi )< τ . 
Now we return to the prove the theorem
Proof. (Theorem 3) For a given R ∈ΩτDn :
aD (Ri) =L `(m+q)
(
i
∑
j=i−`+1
ψ jψTj
)
< τD (60)
for i = `+ k′, ...,n. Lemma 1 then gives us that:
i
∑
j=i−`+1
ψTj ψ j =
i
∑
j=i−`+1
r¯Tj r¯ j +
i
∑
j=i−`+1
eTj e j < (m+q)ε
(61)
for i = `+ k′, ...,n. Furthermore we have that:
RTn Q
τD
i,n Rn =
i
∑
j=i−`+1
r¯Tj r¯ j < (m+q)ε (62)
for i = `+ k′, ...,n. Therefore R ∈ΘτDn . 
Now, we construct an outer approximation to Rτ∗n using
the constraint sets Θτ∗n :
Theorem 4. Suppose A¯n−1 and Rn−1 are defined as in (33)
and (12) respectively, Rτ∗n is the set in (31), Φ is a compact
semi-algebraic set such that Rτ∗n ⊂Φ, Θτ∗n−1 is defined based
on the choice of detector and:
Hτ∗n =
1
1− cH (63)
where H and c are the solution to:
inf
H∈S c∈R
∫
Φ
(
δT Hδ + c
)
dδ (64)
s.t. δT Hδ + c≥ 0 δ ∈Φ (65)
RTn−1A¯
T
n−1HA¯n−1Rn−1+ c−1≥ 0 Rn−1 ∈Θτ∗n
(66)
where S⊂Rp×p is the set of symmetric matrices. ThenRτ∗n ⊆
{δ | δT Hτ∗n δ ≤ 1}.
Proof. Let δ ∈ Rτ∗n . Then, from (31), we have that there
exists an Rn−1 ∈ Ωτ∗n−1 ⊆ Θτ∗n such that δ = A¯n−1Rn−1.
Constraint (66) then gives RTn−1A¯
T
n−1HA¯n−1Rn−1 + c ≥ 1.
Furthermore c> 1 since 0 ∈Ωτ∗n−1, so we can rearrange the
inequality resulting in δT 11−c Hδ = δ
T Hτ∗n δ ≤ 1. 
One can solve the program in Theorem 4 using the
Spotless optimization toolbox [22] which formulates the
problem as a Semi-Definite Program that can be solved using
commercial solvers such as MOSEK [23]. This program
assumes that we can find a compact semi-algebraic set Φ
that outer approximates Rτ∗n , which can be done using the
following lemma under the specific case that N = n:
Lemma 2. Suppose N,n ∈ N, such that N ≥ n and if
applicable, suppose N > `+k′ if the detector is the Dynamic
Watermarking detector. Furthermore suppose τ∗ ∈ R such
that τ∗ > 0, A¯n−1 and RN−1 are as in (33),(12). Then there
exists a η ∈ R such that:
{δ = [0q×q(N−n) A¯n−1]RN−1 | RN−1 ∈Θτ∗N−1} ⊂Bη . (67)
Proof. (Lemma 2) First we show that Θτ∗N−1 is bounded.
We denote the upper bounds for the norm of elements in
Θτ∗N−1 as σ
τ∗ , and we use the decomposition of RN−1 =
[r¯TN−1 . . . r¯
T
0 ]
T ∈ Θτ∗N−1. For the χ2 detector we have that
σ τχ2 =
√
Nτχ2 since:
‖[r¯TN−1 . . . r¯T0 ]T‖=
√
N−1
∑
i=0
r¯Ti r¯i ≤
√
Nτχ2 . (68)
Similarly for the CUSUM detector we have that σ τC =√
N(τC +δ ) since:
‖[r¯TN−1 . . . r¯T0 ]T‖=
√
N−1
∑
i=0
r¯Ti r¯i ≤
√
N(τC +δ ). (69)
In the case of the MEWMA detector we have that σ τM =√
NτM(2−β )
β since:
‖Gi‖= ‖β r¯i+(1−β )Gi−1‖ ≤
√
τMβ
2−β (70)
and:
β‖r¯i‖− (1−β )
√
τMβ
2−β ≤ ‖β r¯i+(1−β )Gi−1‖. (71)
Combining (70) and (71) we get:
‖r¯i‖ ≤
√
τM(2−β )
β
. (72)
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Then:
‖[r¯TN−1 . . . r¯T0 ]T‖=
√
N−1
∑
i=0
r¯Ti r¯i ≤
√
NτM(2−β )
β
. (73)
In the case of the Dynamic Watermarking detector, we
have that σ τD =
√
N(m+q)ε , where ε > `− 1− q−m is
the solution to (50), since:
‖[r¯TN−1 . . . r¯T0 ]T‖=
√
N−1
∑
i=0
r¯Ti r¯i ≤
√
N(m+q)ε. (74)
Then, since:
‖[0q×q(N−n) A¯n−1]RN−1‖ ≤
‖[0q×q(N−n) A¯n−1]‖ ‖RN−1‖, (75)
let η = ‖[0q×q(N−n) A¯n−1]‖σ τ∗ . Then:
{δ = [0q×q(N−n) A¯n−1]RN−1 | RN−1 ∈Θτ∗N−1} ⊂Bη . (76)

The program in Theorem 4 gives an upper bound to Rτ∗n ,
which we denote by:
T τ∗n = {δ | δT Hτ∗n δ ≤ 1}. (77)
We dilate T τ∗n to obtain an outer approximation to R
τ∗ :
Theorem 5. Suppose τ∗ ∈ R such that τ∗ > 0, Rτ is as in
(34), T τ∗n is as in (77), and:
E τ∗n =T
τ∗
n ⊕Bε , (78)
where:
ε =
‖An‖√
s1(H
τ∗
n )(1−‖An‖)
. (79)
Then Rτ∗ ⊂ E τ∗n .
To prove this result we must first consider the lemma:
Lemma 3. Suppose n,N,h ∈ N such that 0 < n ≤ h ≤ N,
R= [rTN ...r
T
0 ]
T ∈Θτ∗N where Θτ∗N is defined based on the choice
of detector. Then R′ = [rTh ...r
T
h−n]
T ∈Θτ∗n .
Proof. (of Lemma 3) To prove that R′ is in Θτ∗n we show
that each of the constraints associated with Θτ∗n are included
as a constraint associated with Θτ∗N or that there exists a
more restrictive constraint in Θτ∗N . For the χ
2 test we have
the inclusion of all constraints since using (39) and (40) we
have:
R′T Q
τχ2
(i,n)R
′ = RT Q
τχ2
(i+h−n,N)R< 1 ∀i = 0, ...,n. (80)
Similarly for the CUSUM detector we have that using (41)
and (42) we have:
R′T QτC
(i, j,n)R
′ = RT QτC
(i+h−n, j,N)R< 1
∀ i = 0, ...,n and j = 0, ..., i. (81)
For the MEWMA we have that Θτ∗N has more restrictive
constraints since using (46) and (47) we have:
R′T QτM
(i,n)R
′ ≤ RT QτM
(i+h−n,N)R< 1 ∀i = 0, ...,n. (82)
For The Dynamic Watermarking Detector we have the inclu-
sion of all constraints since for (48) and (49) we have:
R′T QτD
(i,n)R
′ = RT QτD
(i+h−n,N)R< 1 ∀i = `+ k′, ...,n. (83)

Now we return to proving Theorem 5.
Proof. (Theorem 5) Let δ ′ ∈Rτ∗ , and assume that δ ′ /∈ E τ∗n .
Furthermore let:
ε1 = inf{‖δ −δ ′‖ | δ ∈ E τ∗n }. (84)
Now consider that, for a given N > n:
Rτ∗N ⊆ {δ | δ = AN−1X , X ∈Θτ∗N−1}. (85)
Using Minkowski sums we over-approximate this set further
as:
Rτ∗N ⊆ {δ = [A¯n−1 0p×p(N−n)]RN−1 | RN−1 ∈Θτ∗N−1}⊕
⊕
(
j⊕
i=1
Ani{δ = [0p×pi A¯n−1 0p×p(N−n−i)]RN−1 |
RN−1 ∈Θτ∗N−1}
)
⊕
⊕An( j+1){δ = [0p×p(N−n j) A¯h]RN−1 |
RN−1 ∈Θτ∗N−1}. (86)
where N is evenly divisible by n, j+ 1 times and h is the
remainder. Applying Lemma 2 and 3, we have:
Rτ∗N ⊆ {δ = A¯n−1Rn−1 | Rn−1 ∈Θτ∗n−1}⊕
⊕
(
j⊕
i=1
Ani{δ = A¯n−1Rn−1 | Rn−1 ∈Θτ∗n−1}
)
⊕
⊕Bη‖An( j+1)‖ (87)
where η is the maximum radius when applying Lemma 2
for h = 0, ...,n. Let σ = 1√
s1(H
τ∗
n )
then:
{δ = A¯n−1Rn−1 | Rn−1 ∈Θτ∗n−1} ⊂T τ∗i (88)
= {δ | δT Hτ∗n δ ≤ 1} ⊂Bσ . (89)
This means that:
Rτ∗N ⊆T τ∗n ⊕
(
j⊕
i=1
Bσ‖Ani‖
)
⊕Bη‖An( j+1)‖. (90)
Since the Minkowski sum of balls is a ball with its radius as
the sum of the radii, we can increase the outer approximation
by allowing the summation to extend towards infinity:
Rτ∗N ⊆T τ∗n ⊕Bε ⊕Bη‖An( j+1)‖, (91)
where:
ε =
σ‖An‖
(1−‖An‖) ≥
∞
∑
i=1
σ‖Ani‖. (92)
Since j+1> Nn , there exists an N2 such that for N > N2 we
have that η‖An( j+1)‖< ε1 which contradicts δ ∈Rτ∗ .

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B. False Alarm Rate
While decreasing the threshold for a detector decreases
the attack capability, it increases the RFA. As described
in the introduction, to compute this false alarm rate, it is
typically assumed that the residuals are independent [9], [13].
Unfortunately, simulated experiments have noted that this
assumption results in a consistent error between the expected
and simulated results [9]. This is because the residuals are
not independent, which can be confirmed by computing the
auto correlation of the sequence of residuals when no attack
is present:
E[rnrTn−1] = E[(Cδn− zn)(Cδn−1− zn−1)T ]. (93)
By expanding the product and removing uncorrelated terms
one can show that:
E[rnrTn−1] = E[Cδnδ
T
n−1C
T ]−E[CδnzTn−1]. (94)
By applying (5) to (94) and once again canceling uncorre-
lated terms one can show that:
E[rnrTn−1] =C(A+LC)E[δnδ
T
n ]C
T +LΣz. (95)
In fact, correlation affects the rate of false alarms [24]. To
compute the threshold with a specified false alarm rate, we
first fix a specific threshold for each detector and simulate
the behavior of the system. By simulating the system for
a long enough time, we can estimate the rate of false
alarms associated with the fixed threshold. By repeating this
approach for a range of thresholds, we can then build a
lookup table that associates different thresholds with different
false alarm rates. By linearly interpolating between these
thresholds, we can select a threshold that achieves a user-
specified false alarm rate.
V. SIMULATION AND REAL-WORLD COMPARISON
This section describes a simulated comparison in which
the attack capability for a range of false alarm rates is
approximated for each detector, and a real-world comparison
in which the ability of each detection algorithm to detect
particular attacks is explored.
A. Simulation-Based Comparison of Attack Capability
To illustrate the trade-off between the rate of false alarms
and attack capability, we provide a comparison of each of
the detection algorithms using a 2 dimensional model from
[11]:
A =
[
0.84 0.23
−0.47 0.12
]
B =
[
0.07 −0.32
0.23 0.58
]
C =
[
1 0
2 1
]
K =
[
1.404 −1.042
1.842 1.008
]
L =
[
0.0276 0.0448
−0.01998 −0.0290
]
Σz =
[
2 0
0 2
]
Σw =
[
0.035 −0.011
−0.011 0.02
]
Σr =
[
2.086 0.134
0.134 2.230
]
with the addition of a watermark with covariance Σe =
10−2I. Thresholds for the false alarm rates between 0.01
Fig. 2. Approximate reachable set volume for varying false alarm rates
for the example system in section V-A
and 0.3 were found by running the simulation under no
attack for 106 time steps. Using these values, the reachable
sets at time step n = 12 were outer approximated using the
optimization program stated in Theorem 4 and dilated as
stated in Theorem 5 to provide outer approximations of the
steady state reachable sets. The resulting approximations for
the VRS, defined in (35), are plotted against the false alarm
rate in Figure 2 for each of the detectors using various
detector specific parameter selections.
One may note that while these methods provide smooth
curves for the χ2, MEWMA, and Dynamic Watermarking
detectors, the curves for the CUSUM detector appears dis-
continuous, and do not span the entire range of RFA values.
The apparent discontinuity is attributed to the fact that, for
the χ2, MEWMA, and Dynamic Watermarking detectors,
increasing the threshold τ∗ results in a proportional scaling of
the outer approximation of Rτ∗n . However, For the CUSUM
detector, changing the threshold does not have this affect.
In fact, changing the threshold for the CUSUM detector
alters the shape of ΘτCn , resulting in the outer approxima-
tion of RτCn being less conservative for certain threshold
values. Furthermore, the shortened span of the curves for
the CUSUM detector are a result of certain RFA values being
un-achievable for a given forgetting factor.
To determine whether the outer approximation is tight
for the χ2, CUSUM, and MEWMA detectors, simulations
were run for 60 RFA values uniformly spaced between 0.01
and 0.3. In these simulations, the portion of the observer
related to the residual was propagated forward for 105 steps
using the dynamics (30). The residuals were sampled from a
normal distribution with 0 mean and covariance 5I and scaled
if necessary, to avoid alarms. The area of the convex hull of
the observer error for the entire simulation was calculated.
The difference between the over approximated area and the
simulated area ranged from 0.0156− 0.1408 for the χ2,
0.0032− 0.1143 for the CUSUM, and 0.0075− 0.1301 for
the MEWMA. The results indicate that the attack capability
under the Dynamic Watermarking detector is comparable to
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the classic anomaly detectors as a function of false alarm
rate.
B. Real World Implementation
In this section, we evaluate the ability of each of the
anomaly detection schemes to detect attacks using a Segway
Robotics Mobility Platform performing a path-following
task. In addition, we illustrate that adding a watermark to the
system leads to an imperceptible reduction in performance,
while significantly improving the detectability of an attack
that was missed by classic anomaly detectors. Localization
was provided by Google Cartographer [25] using planar
lidar and wheel odometry measurements. For the purpose of
control, a LTV model was fit to the observed data yielding:

e`,n+1
es,n+1
eθ ,n+1
ev,n+1
eθ˙ ,n+1
=

e`,n+(0.0478v˜n)eθ ,n− (0.045 ˙˜θn)es,n
es,n+(0.0478)ev,n+(0.045 ˙˜θn)e`,n
eθ ,n+0.045eθ˙ ,n
ev,n−0.1ev,n−4+0.1uv,n
0.6eθ˙ ,n+0.15eθ˙ ,n−4+0.24uθ˙ ,n
 (96)
where the state is represented in trajectory error coordinates
for a given nominal trajectory where e`,n,es,n, and eθ ,n are
the lateral, longitudinal, and heading error, ev,n,eθ˙ ,n are the
error in the velocity and angular velocity, v˜n, ˙˜θn are the
nominal velocity and angular velocity and uv,n,uθ˙ ,n are the
deviation from the nominal inputs.
For a constant nominal velocity of 0.6 m/s and angular
velocity of 0 rad/s, this model can be represented as an LTI
model with state vector:
x =
[
e`,n es,n eθ ,n ev,n eθ˙ ,n ev,n−1
ev,n−2 ev,n−3 eθ˙ ,n−1 eθ˙ ,n−2 eθ˙ ,n−3
]T
. (97)
For the sake of brevity, the A and B matrices are not stated
explicitly but can be found by expanding (96). The feedback
gain matrix K was found to make the closed loop system
Schur Stable and is approximately:
K =

0 −1.639
0 −1.984
−0.313 0
−0.212 0
0 −0.384
0.019 0
0.020 0
0.021 0
0.022 0
0 −0.039
0 −0.043
0 −0.052
0 −0.065

(98)
Similarly the observer gain matrix L was found to make the
observer Schur Stable and is approximately:
L =

−0.791 −0.016 0 0 0
−0.002 −0.501 0 0 −0.022
0 0 −0.272 −0.025 0
0 0 −0.011 −0.252 0
0 −0.003 0 0 −0.240
0 0 −0.013 −0.258 0
0 0 −0.015 −0.187 0
0 0 −0.015 −0.133 0
0 0 −0.014 −0.091 0
0 −0.004 0 0 −0.395
0 −0.010 0 0 −0.145
0 −0.008 0 0 −0.054
0 −0.005 0 0 −0.024

(99)
The steady state covariance of the residuals, Σr, was approx-
imated using the sample covariance from data generated by
the Segway following a straight line down a 16 m hallway
40 times. To avoid the effects of the transient behavior at the
start of each run, the beginning of each run was ignored. This
experiment was repeated a second time after the introduction
of a watermark into the control input with covariance:
Σe =
[
0.02 0
0 0.03
]
, (100)
in order to approximate Σψ . The average location error was
0.0262 m for the non-watermarked runs and 0.0506 m for
the watermarked runs. While adding the watermark increased
the location error, the average error did not hinder overall
performance during the lane-following task.
Threshold values for the false alarm rates of 0.01,
0.03, and 0.05 were approximated for the χ2, CUSUM,
and MEWMA detectors using the residuals from the un-
watermarked runs. Thresholds for the Dynamic Watermark-
ing detector and the same false alarm rates were found
using the residuals from the watermarked runs. The resulting
threshold values are displayed in Table I.
Two attacks, following differing models, were then ap-
plied. Attack model 1 assumes that the attacker adds random
noise to the system such that vn ∼ N (0,10−5I). Attack
model 2 takes the form:
vn =−(Cxn+ zn)+Cξn+ζn. (101)
For this model, the attack measurement noise ζn is added to
the false state such that ζn ∼N (0,Σζ ) and the false state
ξn ∈ Rp is updated according to the closed loop dynamics
of the system:
ξn+1 = (A+BK)ξn+ωn (102)
with attack process noise ωn∼N (0,Σω). The attack process
and measurement noise were chosen to leave the distribution
of the residuals unchanged.
For each attack, 10 experimental runs were completed
without a watermark and 10 with a watermark for a total of
40 experimental runs. The runs with a watermark were used
in evaluating the Dynamic Watermarking detector, while all
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RFA χ2
CUSUM MEWMA Dyn. Wat.
γ = (15 / 17 / 19) β = (0.6 / 0.7 / 0.8) `= (20 / 25 / 30)
0.05 12.08 ( 51.04 / 12.27 / 2.21 ) ( 13.09 / 15.00 / 16.85 ) ( 99.570 / 103.74 / 105.59 )
0.03 14.29 ( 655.81 / 384.73 / 158.68 ) ( 15.05 / 17.59 / 20.17 ) ( 103.05 / 106.73 / 108.58 )
0.01 21.38 ( 1535.94 / 1445.58 / 1355.22 ) ( 20.68 / 24.85 / 28.88 ) ( 108.58 / 110.79 / 113.94 )
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTALLY FOUND THRESHOLDS FOR VARIOUS FALSE ALARM RATES AND
DETECTOR SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THE REAL WORLD IMPLEMENTATION IN SECTION V-B
other detectors used the un-watermarked data. The resulting
detection rates, defined as the number of alarms divided
by the total number of time steps in the attacked runs, are
displayed in Table II.
Method RFA
Attack Model 1 Attack Model 2
Detection Rates Detection Rates
χ2
0.05 0.69 0.03
0.03 0.62 0.01
0.01 0.47 0.00
CUSUM
γ=(15/17/19)
0.05 ( 0.98 / 0.99 / 0.99 ) ( 0.00 / 0.00 / 0.00 )
0.03 ( 0.81 / 0.86 / 0.92 ) ( 0.00 / 0.00 / 0.00 )
0.01 ( 0.58 / 0.54 / 0.51 ) ( 0.00 / 0.00 / 0.00 )
MEWMA
β=(0.6/0.7/0.8)
0.05 ( 0.51 / 0.57 / 0.62 ) ( 0.03 / 0.03 / 0.03 )
0.03 ( 0.45 / 0.50 / 0.54 ) ( 0.01 / 0.01 / 0.01 )
0.01 ( 0.32 / 0.35 / 0.39 ) ( 0.00 / 0.00 / 0.00 )
Dyn. Wat.
`=(20/25/30)
0.05 ( 1.00 / 1.00 / 1.00 ) ( 0.98 / 1.00 / 1.00 )
0.03 ( 1.00 / 1.00 / 1.00 ) ( 0.97 / 0.99 / 1.00 )
0.01 ( 1.00 / 1.00 / 1.00 ) ( 0.95 / 0.98 / 1.00 )
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTALLY FOUND ALARM RATES FOR VARIOUS DETECTOR
SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THE ATTACK MODELS FROM SECTION V-B
For attack model 1, all of the detectors are able to reliably
detect the attack, confirming that the implementation of the
detectors is correct. For attack model 2 the detection rate
decrease from the RFA for the χ2, CUSUM, and MEWMA
detectors. This may be due to the residuals for the un-
attacked system not being distributed as a Gaussian distribu-
tion resulting in higher threshold values. Since attack model
2 replaces the feedback completely, the resulting residu-
als, when under attack, do follow a Gaussian distribution
which then results in lower detection rates. The Dynamic
Watermarking detector in the presence of the second attack
provides a high detection rates for each set of parameters,
and in some cases achieves a perfect detection rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper derives a method to evaluate the capability
of an attacker without raising an alarm for χ2, CUSUM,
MEWMA, and Dynamic Watermarking detectors. Using this
notion of attack capability, this paper illustrates that all con-
sidered detectors have comparable performance. However,
on a real-world system, Dynamic Watermarking is the only
detector that is capable of detecting the presence of a certain
class of attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Abrams and J. Weiss, “Malicious Control System Cyber
Security Attack Case Study - Maroochy Water Services,
Australia,” McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, 2008.
[2] R. Langner, “Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon,”
IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 49–51, 2011.
[3] R. M. Lee, M. J. Assante, and T. Conway, “Analysis of
the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid,” Electricity
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), 2016.
[4] M. Amoozadeh, A. Raghuramu, C. N. Chuah, D. Ghosal,
H. Michael Zhang, J. Rowe, and K. Levitt, “Security Vul-
nerabilities of Connected Vehicle Streams and Their Impact
on Cooperative Driving,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 126–132, 2015.
[5] D. Dominic, S. Chhawri, R. M. Eustice, D. Ma, and A.
Weimerskirch, “Risk Assessment for Cooperative Auto-
mated Driving,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop
on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy - CPS-SPC
’16, 2016, pp. 47–58.
[6] Q. A. Chen, Y. Yin, Y. Feng, Z. M. Mao, and H. X. Liu, “Ex-
posing Congestion Attack on Emerging Connected Vehicle
based Traffic Signal Control,” in Network and Distributed
System Security (NDSS) Symposium, 2018.
[7] H. Hotelling, “Multivariate Quality Control,” Techniques of
Statistical Analysis, 1947.
[8] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “False Data Injection Attacks in
Control Systems,” in First Workshop on Secure Control
Systems, 2010, pp. 226–231.
[9] C. Murguia and J. Ruths, “CUSUM and Chi-squared Attack
Detection of Compromised Sensors,” in IEEE Conference
on Control Applications (CCA), 2016, pp. 474–480.
[10] M. Porter, A. Joshi, P. Hespanhol, A. Aswani, M. Johnson-
Roberson, and R. Vasudevan, “Simulation and Real-World
Evaluation of Attack Detection Schemes: Video,” 2018.
[Online]. Available: www.roahmlab.com/acc2019_
dynwatermark_video.
[11] C. Murguia and J. Ruths, “On Reachable Sets of Hidden
CPS Sensor Attacks,” in American Control Conference,
2018.
[12] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “On the Performance Degradation of
Cyber-Physical Systems under Stealthy Integrity Attacks,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61, no. 9,
pp. 2618–2624, 2016.
[13] D. Umsonst and H. Sandberg, “Anomaly Detector Metrics
for Sensor Data Attacks in Control Systems,” in American
Control Conference, 2018.
[14] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure Control Against Replay
Attacks,” in 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communi-
cation, Control, and Computing, 2009, pp. 911–918.
[15] B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar, “Dynamic Watermark-
ing: Active Defense of Networked Cyber-Physical Systems,”
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 2, pp. 219–240, 2017.
[16] S. Weerakkody, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting Integrity
Attacks on Control Systems Using Robust Physical Water-
marking,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Deci-
sion and Control, vol. 2015-Febru, 2014, pp. 3757–3764.
[17] P. Hespanhol, M. Porter, R. Vasudevan, and A. Aswani,
“Dynamic Watermarking for General LTI Systems,” in IEEE
Conference on Decicision and Control, Melbourne, 2017.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.
07760.
[18] ——, “Statistical Watermarking for Networked Control Sys-
tems,” in American Control Conference, Milwaukee, 2018.
10
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1709.
08617.
[19] T. W. Anderson, An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical
Analysis, 3rd ed. Wiley, 2003.
[20] F. L. Lewis, L. Xie, and D. Popa, Optimal and Robust
Estimation, 2nd ed. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2008.
[21] J. B. Lasserre, Moments, Positive Polynomials and Their
Applications. 2010.
[22] M. M. Tobenkin, F. Permenter, and A. Megretski, Spotless
Library, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://github.
com/spot-toolbox/spotless.
[23] M. ApS, The mosek optimization toolbox for matlab manual.
version 8.1. 2017. [Online]. Available: http://docs.
mosek.com/8.1/toolbox/index.html.
[24] T. J. Harris and W. H. Ross, “Statistical Process Control
Procedures for Correlated Observations,” The Canadian
Journal of Chemical Engineering, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 48–57,
1991.
[25] W. Hess, D. Kohler, H. Rapp, and D. Andor, “Real-Time
Loop Closure in 2D LIDAR SLAM,” Proceedings - IEEE
International Conference on Robotics and Automation, vol.
2016-June, pp. 1271–1278, 2016.
11
